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In historical parlance we know of ups and downs and of
turning points. The two, however, may not be confused. While
the former denotes a continuity of the status quo, the
latter is indicative of a break away with the past. The
recent victory of Hizbullah though a positive development
should not be seen as a turning point. Nor should we let
this event hijack the intellectual discourse in the Muslim
world.
That Hizbullah has astutely exposed, probably for the first
time in recent history, the supposed invincibility of Israel
and many in the Arab world are expressing their disgust for
the long cherished Arab inaction, is no doubt indicative of
the birth of new emotions. If a small militia of motivated
individuals can confront the most sophisticated army, why
not the 56 Muslim states, with so much of resources at their
command, can take control of their own destiny? The analogy
is simple though highly misleading.
Having been prisoners of rhetoric for so long, we prefer to
live with fallacies. If every Muslim simply throws a bucket
of water on Israel, so we are told, the Israeli state will
be eradicated. This could be a marvellous poetic idea but it
fails to enlighten us why the Muslims have not been able to
act it out? Emotionally charged rhetoric and worn out
pompous terminologies that we are so fond of using have in
fact made our intellectual discourse futile as they no
longer refer to the real world but stem from an imaginary
world of our own making.
Not only is the intellectual discourse in the Muslim world
devoid of vital issues, in fact the entire Ummah today is
living in a fake world. Let me explain! On the surface it
appears as if the Muslim world is bubbling with zest of
life, the rulers are sovereign in their policy-making and
the religious life is in full swing. But a close look at the
situation tells us altogether a different story. True, they
have an army and a semblance of state apparatus, but they
are merely to uphold that illusion, that pomp without power.
The same is true of the religious hemisphere where a host of
tarbush-clad ulema and ghotra-laden shauykh are ever willing
to lay out minute details of ritual worship. But here too
things are more theatrical than the real. Many amongst them
claim to be the faqeeh-ul-asr or the grand mufti, thereby
creating an illusion that in this age they are the epitome
of religious understanding while in reality if they can do
anything they can only copiously quote from the wisdom of
the dead. Be they religious scholars or the ruling elite,
they live in a fake world, as characters of an orchestrated
drama, as shadows of the real self.
As an Ummah our predicament is two-fold; we are unable to
see the things as they are, and secondly, we often take an
ordinary event as a turning point. The high pitch of
optimism during the recent Lebanon crisis had better explain
this point. The recent ‘victory’ of Hizbollah in Lebanon was
a strange victory where the victor had no say in stipulating
the conditions for a ceasefire. Hizbullah has been
successful, no doubt, in maintaining her psychological and
emotional self intact. Given the military prowess of Israel,
this in itself is a great achievement. But calling it an
outright victory is not only disastrous for our future, it
also leaves many vital questions unanswered. Why despite our
willingness to do everything possible we fail to confront
the enemy on equal technological footing? Why despite the
paucity of human and material resources at out command today
we have access to some crude and far less effective zilzal
missiles and not a laser-guided precision bomb or an F-16 or
a B-52 bomber? Resistance can create hurdles and even it can
successfully bring down a mighty empire but it cannot build
in its place an alternative system. A revival of the Ummah
then, certainly has to come from somewhere else.
Removing the intellectual detours:
The language of resistance can be no match for language of
mercy. At a point of history when the language of resistance
has created some intellectuals detour for us, an
intellectual breakthrough leading to reconstructing the
prophetic metaphor requires a critical look at our heritage
literature spanning some thirteen centuries. As it has been
the norm to look at the early centuries as our golden age,
it became difficult to distinguish the pious elders from the
rotten ones, the latter being known as fabricators. Once an
alien thought stealthily made its way in early writings, it
was unmindfully quoted by the later writers so much so that
they became the very part and parcel of our intellectual
self. Take for example the Tafseer literature which will
simply cease to exist if we remove the folktales or the
Israeliyat as we call it, and where one is never sure which
historical context really served as prelude to the
revelation. The same is true of the Hadith compendiums that
were mainly compiled to drive the fabricators away.
Mysticism has a strong penchant for Christian monastic
tradition and the much celebrated issues in Muslim theology
such as free-will and determinism speak of Greek influences.
And finally, the very transformation of Islamic polity into
dynastic rule owe much to the local tribal ethos and the
kingship pattern prevalent during the time. Needless to
emphasise, the intellectual heritage in Islam is yet to be
purged out of the alien notions that infiltrated in early
years, more precisely during the second century of Islam.
The emergence of dynastic rule in Islam which dates back as
early as the first century Hijra was not in consonance with
the Quranic worldview yet it was generally tolerated to
avoid the internal feuds that had gripped the early Muslim
society after the murder of the third caliph. And after the
failed attempt of Omer II who wanted to restore the
prophetic model of governance it was assumed that political
reformation may not yield positive results and hence Muslim
should accept the status quo for the sake of unity and
peace. From Omer II to the last Ottoman caliph, a period
spanning some twelve centuries, an official version of Islam
was mainly controlled by the political system. The shaikhul
Islam or the chief religious authority played a key role in
shaping the Muslim mind. History records many a great
luminaries of Islam who in their own times were considered
as great scholars but as they did not enjoy state patronage
they were marginalised in their time and their great works
did not survive. Out of some 50 great fuqaha of the first
two centuries only four could survive and that too due to
the canonization of the four schools of sunni Islam during
the reign of Malik-az-zahir Sultan Bibars. We also hear of
many collections of Hadith and many compendiums of
authenticated traditions (sahih) that are no more available
to us.
The official Islam however was no monolithic version as it
had to cope with the changing political equations. We had
the Umvi Islam against the Alwides and also the Khawarij’s
who maintained an equal distance from both of them. The
Abbasid had their own version of Islam and so had the
Fatmides of Egypt and those who founded the Spanish Khilafah
away from the central control. As the ruling elite
monopolised Islamic interpretation the un-official versions
were to find a space only on the margins. Their exponents
were either crushed by ruthless political power or they were
to keep their mouths shut -- a process that latter came to
be known as taqyyia, a well thought out philosophy of
political pacifism. The exponent of official Islam
maintained that accepting the waliul-amr, no matter even he
acquired power by brute force, was in the greater interest
of Islam and Muslims. Changing the political set-up by armed
struggle was openly discouraged and the rebels were dubbed
as khawarij. The official Islam thus came to be known as the
sabilul-momeneen, enjoying the blessings of God. Controlling
the interpretation of Islam and twisting it to their own
agenda, the system left almost no room to reconstruct the
original Quranic paradigm without dismantling the system
itself. Today any attempt to reconstructing the Quranic
paradigm once again or reinventing the language of mercy
cannot be successful unless we have insight into the social
and political history of the early two centuries that were
instrumental in shaping Islam of the status quo.
Alien influences on the Muslim mind:
Have you ever thought that the uloom sharei or the religious
sciences which Muslims regard today as the highest branch of
knowledge have their roots not in the Quranic worldview
alone rather, a number of other factors had key role in
their development. If the supposedly Islamic sciences are
the sum total of knowledge why it is so that the upholders
of sharei sciences fail to produce a better technology for
our defence? As for those who devote themselves to exploring
the signs of God the religious scholars look down upon them;
for according to them they are involved in lesser sciences
often associated with some sort of secularity and
irreligiosity. The contempt for non-sharei sciences drove
many of our best minds away from explorations and inventions
thereby reducing the entire Ummah into a group of consumers.
The so-called religious sciences that comprise today an
incomprehensible amount of fiqhi literature where revelatory
intent is often lost in hair-splitting debates and where for
centuries an open-ended discussions about the authenticity
of transmitters remains unabated, one wonders weather they
really serve any purpose. The first generation of Muslim had
certainly no access to the compendiums of fiqh or the books
of rijal, nor were they aware of exegetical manoeuvring, or
dreamt of getting to the hidden meanings of the text. For
them Quran was a book of guidance in plain and simple
language. God had conveyed to them what He wanted to,
leaving nothing for the clergy to interpret. The first
generation of Muslims hardly knew of alien terminologies
such as fardh, wajib, nafil, sunnah, mubah, mustahab etc.
The Quran created a rational mind urging the faithful to
reflect on the cosmic wonders. The natural world was
declared a subject of study for all those seeking knowledge.
And those astounded by the signs of God were called as real
scholars. This was the original Quranic paradigm of
knowledge and signposts for future revolution. Had the
Muslim mind operated within this paradigm the study of
natural sciences would certainly have come to us as a
religious obligation. But unfortunately owing to the
political instability and the infiltration of alien
ideologies the Quranic worldview could not remain intact for
long.
How it all happened needs serious investigation. The civil
strife that had engulfed the entire world of Islam after the
murder of the third Caliph was a congenial atmosphere for
all those who wanted to dilute the divine message. From this
period onward, we see the sudden emergence of a host of
public entertaining intellectuals, the qassas and
pseudo-scholars of prophetic traditions who wanted to change
Islam from within. Such an attack was more dangerous than
the arm rebellions of the Bedouin tribes. Omer II was aware
of the sensitivity of Hadith literature and hence he made a
concerted effort to compile the authentic traditions to
distinguish them from the fabricated ones. But the short
span of Omer’s rule did not allow him to accomplish this
great intellectual project. The ideological infiltration
through the backdoors of history continued and it was
entirely on the individual scholars of the time to address
this issue. Much has been written about how to distinguish
the true traditions from the false ones, however, almost
none of our great scholars have realised that the very
development of sharei sciences owe much to social milieu,
much less the product of a planned activity. This abrupt and
unplanned development of knowledge in Islam later had a
devastating impact on the Muslim mind. The division of
knowledge into sharei and non-sharei sciences, or into
Islamic and secular, not only created a social role for the
clergy it also blocked the emergence of scientific and
rational thinking among Muslims. It was a major paradigm
shift, changing the direction of the Ummah forever.
A religion for all time and place as Islam claims to be,
nevertheless, it had to make its beginning in a tribal
set-up. The early generation of Muslims were aware of the
limitations of a tribal polity as they tirelessly worked to
transform their political set-up to suit the demands of the
divine message. In their efforts to broaden their
socio-political horizon they did not hesitate to learn from
the existing models. As the empire went on expanding, at
times their own previously held positions came under
scrutiny. Omer I is reported to have altered many a
previously held decisions of the prophet’s time. At times
this resulted in a blatant moratorium of some of the nass
explicitly mentioned in the Quran. Suspension of the Quranic
hadd of amputating one’s hand for theft, or denying goodwill
amount (mu’allifatun quloob) to the neo-converts, or
confiscating conquered land in favour of the state are some
of the well-known decision of Omer I. When Omer I was taking
a stance different from the one stipulated in the text or
when he was altering a prophetic precedent on an specific
issue, he knew it well that sanctity is not for any specific
judgement or a period of history, rather it is for the
‘intent’ and spirit of the message. This creative approach
to the text made it possible for the early generation of
Muslim to benefit from other existing models of statecraft.
They would hardly reject anything simply because it had its
roots in alien civilization. Take for example the war of
trench on which depended the very survival of the Ummah.
Digging a trench for the protection of the city was alien to
the Arab mind. But they showed no reservation in accepting
this Persian technique. As long as Muslims displayed a
creative openness towards other nations and their collective
heritage they greatly benefited from them. However, the
early centuries of Islam had also witnessed a large-scale
conversion of the Jewish and Christian ulema who had an
established tradition of religious studies and who had
brought along with them an entire methodology of religious
interpretation. As long as the creative minds and great
visionaries of Islam remained in command, the simplicity of
Islamic interpretation was maintained. Omer I openly
discouraged the birth of a Mishnah or compilation of any
apocryphal material. However, in later years, especially in
the days of fitna things changed drastically. And it was
here that the things went wrong.
By the end of the first century hijra, a new breed of
Islamically oriented public entertainers known as the
story-tellers (qassas), the transmitters of traditions
(huffaz) and the popular preachers (wae’z) appeared on the
scene. As the days went by, memoirs of the prophet’s time
became serious concern for historiographers. Initially,
these memoirs had emotional and historical import but
gradually they were also taken as sources for religious
legislation. By the mid of the second century hijra they
were taken as rather authentic expose of the Quranic intent.
The early qassas and huffaz, in their efforts to recreate
the prophetic era in detail, employed all available sources,
from the text to popular anecdotes, and from the authentic
traditions to the less authentic reports. A proper
methodology to this effect was underway as often the role of
huffaz and the qassas, the mufassirun and the mutasawwefin
overlapped. Muhammed bin Idris al-Shafei was the first
scholar who through his methodical writings on fiqh paved
the way for a future generation of specialist and it was
mainly due to his efforts that Islamic interpretation became
the monopoly of the learned few. Shahab Zahri who appears at
the close of the first century as the towering personality
was no legist. It took almost another hundred years to look
at simple memories of the prophet’s time as the sources of
Shariah. The publication of Al-Risala was a turning point in
the intellectual history of Islam. Hence on ward
interpretation of Islam had to become monopoly of the
clergy. The new clergy would not have claimed the sole right
to interpret God’s intent had the latter scholars not
conceived knowledge divided into two distinct categories,
the sharei and non-sharei sciences, the former being the
sole prerogative of the ulema. Thus began the Vaticanization
of Islam. Lending credence to some susceptible reports the
ulema of Islam even claimed to be the deputies of the
prophet and repositories of all prophetic knowledge. The
idea that some knowledge were Islamic and some non-Islamic
or some were useful while the others had little utility was
bone of contention in the Abbasid Baghdad when Greek logic
and philosophy had created a stir in the intellectual
capital of Islam. While this division helped curb the
influence of Greek sciences, nevertheless, it also sent the
rational thinking to a permanent exile outside the
boundaries of sharei knowledge. Even a major portion of the
Quran that urges Muslims to explore and take command of the
natural world went beyond the scope of sharei sciences. The
upholders of sharei knowledge or supposedly the super
sciences were guilty of suspending a major part of the
revelation as their focus lay on the verses of ahkam alone.
This brought the Muslim mind to a blind ally from where it
has yet to be rescued despite the elapse of some twelve
centuries.
In Islam the development of sharei sciences had an abrupt
start. They were more products of a chaos than a proper
planning. The main reason for this intellectual anarchy was
the political instability or the internal feuds that had
plagued the Muslim world since Caliph Osman’s murder. As the
institution of khilafa had collapsed and a dynasty had taken
control of the situation, the priority of the new rulers was
to seek legitimacy for their governance rather than
safeguarding Islamic ideology. The exponents of sharei
sciences and the transmitters of prophetic traditions were
willing to lend their support to the new dynasty. They would
often relate that the prophet had asked to obey the ruler
even if he was a tyrant. The system that sought legitimacy
from the new emerging clergy was certainly not in a position
to hold them in check.
By the mid of the second century the huffaz attained such a
social prominence that an entire populace would come to
greet them when they visit another town. Such honours of
mammoth public receptions were not available even to the
rulers. Reminiscing the days of the prophet had an emotional
appeal. It is said when these huffaz held their majlis,
thousands of people joined them noting down each and every
word they uttered. By the third century Hijra, Hadith
emerged as the main discipline of knowledge and one’s
scholarship was judged by the number of traditions that he
had committed to memory. Scholars of Hadith openly vied each
other claiming to have more thulathi (traditions with a
chain of three transmitters) and ruba’ei (a chain of four
transmitters) than anyone else did. Later, when compilation
of knowledge became the norm and book writing came in vogue,
number of volumes became the criteria of scholarship rather
than the quality. A certain scholar claimed that he could
write volumes after volumes just to enlighten the various
shades of meaning in bismillah. While yet another scholar
claimed that he could produce as much as seven camel’s load
just to explain the dot of the letter ba of bismillah. What
became important was the number of volumes one produced and
not the quality of the content. Tabari, whose major writings
have survived to our time, proudly tells that the thirty
volume of his tafseer is in fact a summery of the original
that he wrote in 300 volumes. And Bukhari, who lists some
more than 4000 traditions under various headings, claims
that he has selected them out of 0.6 million traditions
known to him. Abuzar’a is yet another example who is said to
have memorised 0.7 million traditions. Today, we have
neither access to the 300 volumes of Tabari nor have we any
means to verify the tall claims of Bukhari and Abuzar’a. But
the fact that amount of writing was the criteria of judging
one’s scholarship can easily be discerned from even a
cursory look at our heritage literature. Sayuti (849-911),
the famous author of Al-Itqan, claims in his preface that
his encyclopaedia of the Quran has incorporated everything
thing on the topic and that he has extracted all useful
material from all available sources. Extracting everything
from the past masters and incorporating each available
information without a proper evaluation was the norm of
religious writing that can be seen from Tabari down to our
time. The ummahat-ul kutub, or the heritage literature as we
call them today, soon became sources of religious disputes.
As critical evaluation of the past masters was not the norm,
the ulema felt content on writing their commentary to
justify their respective schools of thought. Soon writings
on the margins or adding copious notes to a text itself
became a criterion of scholarship. We have great scholars
down the ages writing margins on the margins or further
elaborating these explanatory notes. Then, we witness a
reversal of the trend, great scholars preparing summaries of
great works. Some of these summaries became so puzzling that
a host of latter scholars took the task of elaborating them
further. This never-ending cycle went on and on because
there was a general consensus, rather un-mindfulness, among
Muslims that the great masters of the past had perfected the
process of thinking for us and that we were too humble to
engage with the revelation on our own.
The sharei sciences that abruptly began and chaotically
developed have been the root cause of intellectual anarchy
and internecine conflicts. Not only the very nomenclature of
ilm sharei speaks of a flawed vision, the way these sharei
uloom developed into major disciplines is greatly flawed.
Let us briefly summarise:
Islamic sciences as we know them today as tafseer wa
ta’weel, jirh wa tadeel, rawayat wa dirayat, usool al-fiqh,
mantiq wa falsafa, urooz wa balaghat etc were not found in
their present form during the prophet’s time.
The political instability emanating from the murder of third
caliph and the internecine conflicts provided a congenial
atmosphere for the popular preachers and story-tellers. As
the system drew its legitimacy from less authentic
reportage, the qassas culture flourished. In this
intellectually volatile situation it was easy for the
pretenders and fabricators to get mixed with the genuine
scholars. We should not lose sight of the fact that early
centuries were not only the time when the pious elders lived
amongst us. The same period is also notorious for fake ulema
and fabricators.
The sudden emergence of huffaz on the social and
intellectual scene was mainly due to the socio-political
situation of the time. For the ruling elite huffaz (scholars
of traditions) were more relevant than the qurra (scholars
of the Quran) as they can put forward a supporting tradition
from the vastly unknown amount of historic material. Latter
scholars who came under the delusion that historic material
or reportage constituted the core of Islamic knowledge
failed to notice the blatant political factors that
surrounded its development.
The encyclopaedic collection of hadith and their thematic
listing -- as we find in Bukhari, or preserving the history
of first generation of Muslims as a model for future -- as
we find in Mua’tta of Malik, or laying down some basic
principles to draw inference from the text -- as we find in
Abu Hanifa, or formulating a well thought out methodology to
reach an agreeable consensus within the ambit of text and
tradition -- as we find in Shafei, all such efforts were the
personal inititatives of these great scholars. They were not
commanded by God to do so, nor can their individual efforts
form as the intellectual basis of Islam. The great scholars
or imam whose works have come down to us were not the only
people involved in intellectual activity. History records
many a great luminaries of Islam whose works were lost in
course of time. But it never occurs to us that without them
our knowledge of Islam is incomplete. Why do we believe then
that the great masters of the past whose works have somehow
come down to us are indispensable sources of Islamic
knowledge and without them we cannot envision an authentic
Islamic living?
the canonization of four fiqhi schools in sunni Islam and
that of the imamate in sh’ie Islam which many of us have
come to believe as God-ordained were in fact products of
political situations of the time. Had Sultan Bibars (658-676
AH) not accorded state patronage to these four schools, the
four imams and their followers would have met the same fate
as the followers of Sufian Sauri and imam Auza’ei. In their
time, Sauri and Auza’ei enjoyed mass following, probably
more than any of the four, but now we find their names
mentioned only in history books. Bibars’ decision to accord
official status to these four schools was basically to quell
the internal feuds and it was his personal initiative. A
sultan’s whim should not let control our destiny.
The uloom sharei as we conceive them today is a false
metaphor as they have no foundation whatsoever in the
Quranic text. They in fact do not appear sharei if we put
them under strict Quranic scrutiny. Intellectual blurredness
of the past should not block our vision for the future.
The narrow conception of ilm sharei has been the main factor
in driving the Muslims away from scientific knowledge. Those
who remained involved in scientific investigations were not
only viewed as satellites of alien civilizations they even
themselves came to believe that instead of opting for the
holy sciences they had chosen a branch of little salvafic
value. As the exponents of uloom sharei claimed monopoly on
Islamic understanding, it was difficult for a less pious
scholar to challenge their pious whims in the light of
revelation and reason.
The sharei scholars consider some 500 verses of the Quran as
ayat ahkam, which according to them are the bedrock of uloom
sharei. This fragmented approach to the text has virtually
placed most part of the Quran outside the boundaries of
sharei studies. Considering the verses of exploration and
invention as not so essential for salvation was a fatal
mistake on the part of scholars of the time and hence it
need not be held sacred by future generations.
These are some of the facts that point to our ideological
dilution through the ages and which though have their roots
in socio-political conditions of the time are now generally
taken as the authentic face of orthodoxy. This ideological
waywardness has been instrumental in changing our worldview
-- from inquisitive to ritualistic, and in holding back a
prospective movement for scientific exploration in Islam. It
was mainly due to this ritualistic mindset that the social
sciences which otherwise should have flourished as
para-Quranic disciplines remain underdeveloped. Many a
reformers in the past who had only some vague sense of our
intellectual rottenness vociferously called for a return to
the Quran. But so strong was the pressure of orthodoxy that
even those who tried hard to make a dent in traditional
thinking or throw out the yoke of canonized fiqh, ended up
only as extensions of their respective fiqhi schools. Today
it is possible to have a fresh and independent reading of
the Quran, more than ever before, as we no more have a
central religious authority to guard the orthodoxy. In the
past, it was possible for a shaikhul Islam to close down the
Darul Funoon – a modern university in Ottoman Turkey, as in
his opinion it fell outside the purview of uloom sharei.
Today the yoke of traditional mind is not so oppressive.
The time for a new start has eventually arrived. But before
we move ahead we need to think hard why we lived content
with our self-orchestrated delusions about uloom sharei, and
for so long. The Quran is an open invitation to think,
ponder and reflect on the signs of God found everywhere in
the natural world. Igniting the rational faculty is the
first step of getting connected. Reason and revelation
together constitute a perfect equilibrium, an organic whole.
This is the essence of Quranic message which enjoins upon
the believers to look at the entire book as one single
whole. On the contrary, a fragmented approach to the text
that picks us only some versus as the commanding verses
(ayate ahkam) can often make us guilty of upholding
half-truths, so explicitly condemned in the Quran:
afatumenoona bi badhul kitab wa yakfuroona bi badh.
As the development of knowledge, which has a direct bearing
on our worldview, has been abrupt, unplanned and flawed we
need to move through our heritage literature with utmost
care and if possible get rid of them as quickly as we can.
This intellectual breakthrough alone can herald a new
beginning and ensure us a return to the seat of authority
and guidance. |